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 General Equilibrium with Free Entry:
 A Synthetic Approach to the Theory
 of Perfect Competition*
 By WILLIAM NOVSHEK
 Purdue University
 and
 HUGO SONNENSCHEIN
 Princeton University
 The essay is dedicated to the memory of Tjalling Koopmans (1910-
 1985). Our purpose has been to communicate to the nonspecialist
 an aspect of mathematical economics that has been developed since
 Koopman's masterful exposition of general equilibrium theory (1957).
 It is very difficult to do the job as well as Professor Koopmans, but
 he urged us all to trty.
 I. Introduction
 THE TWO DISTINCT THEORIES of perfect
 competition, the Marshallian and the
 Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie (ADM), as-
 sume price-taking behavior as a funda-
 mental. Filling blackboards with partial
 equilibrium diagrams, professors empha-
 size the Marshallian theory at the under-
 graduate level. As students progress,
 their teachers introduce them to the
 Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie theory, Gerard
 Debreu's Theory of Value (1959), the
 framework in which "highbrow theorists"
 explore the relation between perfect
 competition and economic efficiency.
 During the first half of this century, Mar-
 shallian analysis unquestionably domi-
 nated the theory of value. Although this
 probably remains true, a growing num-
 ber of papers in the applied areas adopt
 a variant of the ADM framework. Only
 in this context can they discuss the im-
 portance of interactions among markets
 and the distribution of wealth.
 The Marshallian and ADM theories
 have many striking and essential differ-
 ences, for example:
 1. The ADM theory specifies a fixed
 finite number of firms. The Mar-
 shallian theory postulates a pool of
 firms, any number of which may be
 active in the market.
 2. The ADM theory postulates that
 the technology of each firm is con-
 vex, which rules out increasing re-
 turns to scale. The Marshallian the-
 * We gratefully acknowledge the support of the
 National Science Foundation and our universities.
 We also thank Susan Elms for editorial assistance.
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 ory postulates that the average cost
 curve of each firm is U-shaped,
 based on the assumption of fixed
 costs of production or regions of in-
 creasing returns to scale.
 3. The ADM theory assumes price-
 taking behavior regardless of the
 number of firms. The Marshallian
 theory assumes it only if the effi-
 cient scale is small relative to de-
 mand.
 4. ADM theory, a general equilibrium
 theory, relates perfect competition
 and economic efficiency. Most of
 Marshallian analysis, partial equi-
 librium, ignores intermarket ef-
 fects.
 5. Finally, the ADM theory is a static
 one, to which the adjoinment of dy-
 namics via a tatonnement is not very
 satisfactory. The Marshallian analy-
 sis of equilibria is a dynamic one
 in the sense that entry and exit of
 firms cease in equilibria.
 This essay explains a new theory of per-
 fect competition, a synthesis of the ADM
 and Marshallian theories, and summa-
 rizes the recent work of many researchers
 (for example, Philippe Artzner, Carl Si-
 mon, and Hugo Sonnenschein 1986; Oli-
 ver Hart 1979; Andreu Mas-Colell 1974,
 1983, 1986; William Novshek 1980;
 Novshek and Sonnenschein 1978, 1980,
 1983, 1986a, 1986b; Kevin Roberts 1980;
 and Sonnenschein 1982). (See also the
 Symposium Issue, 1980 and the refer-
 ences therein.)
 The new theory enables those econo-
 mists who work in the world of U-shaped
 average cost curves and free entry to
 study intermarket effects and the decen-
 tralization and efficiency of perfect com-
 petition. We believe the traditional
 ADM theory dismays many Marshallians
 because it contains no role for marginal
 firms and insists on competitive behavior
 independent of the firm's ability to influ-
 ence price. The synthetic theory allows
 both for marginal firms and for the firm
 to recognize its influence on price; it pro-
 vides a precise general equilibrium
 framework for positive analysis and a
 framework in which to demonstrate the
 classical theorems of welfare economics.
 In contrast to both the ADM and Mar-
 shallian theories, we integrate into our
 analysis the leading classical explanation
 for price-taking behavior rather than as-
 sume it. We use the term perfect compe-
 tition to describe a situation in which
 firms are arbitrarily small relative to their
 markets. Here firms perceive and take
 account of the price effect of their mar-
 keted quantities. As firms become small
 relative to the market, we observe in ac-
 cordance with Cournot that their influ-
 ence on price disappears and it is the
 limit of this that we call perfect competi-
 tion. Because price-taking behavior is ex-
 plained along the lines of the Cournot
 theory, what we offer might be better
 termed a Cournot-Marshallian-ADM
 synthesis. '
 The Marshallian perspective enriches
 general equilibrium theory. A new con-
 dition effects a close correspondence be-
 tween the general equilibrium model
 and standard intuition. Loosely speaking,
 it requires that prices provide the proper
 entry signals for firms and is a conse-
 quence of the dynamic aspect of Marshal-
 lian analysis. With each firm associated
 with the use of an unpriced and nondi-
 visible resource, sometimes referred to as
 entrepreneurship, in equilibrium the re-
 turns to that factor must fall with entry
 and rise with exit. Such a condition might
 1 It is also important to acknowledge that small
 efficient scale and free entry, while sufficient to guar-
 antee price-taking behavior in the limit, may not be
 necessary (see for example Michael Spence 1983).
 The extent to which free entry alone is sufficient
 (for the price-taking conclusion) is a much debated
 issue and is not discussed here. We believe that with-
 out the assumption of small efficient scale the case
 for price-taking behavior becomes less compelling.
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 seem axiomatic for partial equilibrium
 analysis where we cannot imagine its vio-
 lation, but it is here that a general equi-
 librium perspective is important. In gen-
 eral equilibrium an increase in a
 commodity price, for example, a wage,
 has wealth effects via the changing value
 of the endowment that may increase the
 amount demanded of the commodity, for
 example, leisure, whereas in the typical
 partial equilibrium analysis of the firm
 such wealth effects are ignored. In gen-
 eral equilibrium the condition that prices
 provide the proper entry signals elimi-
 nates certain ADM equilibria. Hence, a
 combination of the Marshallian perspec-
 tive and the general equilibrium per-
 spective leads to better economics.
 Before turning to the theory, a final
 word on the mathematical aspects of this
 paper. The papers on which we have
 based this essay are rather technical.
 Also, in its general form, the model we
 have in mind is more complicated than
 the model of equilibrium found in De-
 breu's classic Theory of Value (1959). In
 order to explain the results to the
 nonspecialist, we must forfeit either gen-
 erality or precision. We will sacrifice gen-
 erality and frame many of our arguments
 in a well-developed example. Although
 we loosely state our propositions, appli-
 cation to our example yields precision.
 Occasionally the included proofs hint at
 the arguments necessary for the general
 case. The interested reader can find
 proper statements and proofs in the ref-
 erences (in particular, Novshek and Son-
 nenschein 1986b).
 II. The ADM and Marshallian Models
 To begin we present stylized versions
 of the ADM and Marshallian models in
 order to accentuate the relation between
 the ADM and Marshallian formulations.
 In particular, we will demonstrate that
 the ADM framework incorporates the
 standard Marshallian specification. Next,
 we will use these models to motivate our
 definition of partial equilibrium markets
 (and general equilibrium economies) in
 which firms are small. This notion lies
 at the heart of our definition of perfect
 competition: Perfectly competitive mar-
 kets (perfectly competitive economies)
 are markets (economies) in which firms
 are arbitrarily small relative to the mar-
 ket (economy).
 A. A Stylized Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie
 Model
 Our development follows Tjalling
 Koopmans' (1957) classic exposition of a
 Robinson Crusoe economy. There are
 two commodities, leisure and food. Rob-
 inson uses his leisure as an input to pro-
 duce food according to constant returns
 to scale technology. Employing a con-
 vention of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie
 theory, we denote labor input as a nega-
 tive quantity and food output as a positive
 one. Summarizing the technology with
 an appropriate choice of units, Figure 1
 indicates that one unit of labor input
 yields one unit of food output. Robinson
 has 24 hours of leisure, his entire initial
 endowment of resources, to offer as labor
 input. Adding his leisure endowment to
 the technology set, we obtain the set T
 of possible aggregate supplies. Each
 point in T, a bundle (1, f), contains 1 units
 of leisure and f units of food and satisfies
 f?-' 24 - 1 (to be feasible, 1 units of leisure
 implies no more than 24 - 1 units of la-
 bor, and food is produced 1: 1 from la-
 bor).
 Indifference curves, connecting equal-
 ly preferred combinations of leisure
 and food, represent Robinson's prefer-
 ences. In the economy of Figure 1, a
 unique "best attainable point" exists,
 which we have denoted by x.
 A price system, a nonzero non-nega-
 tive vector (pl, pf) of commodity prices,
 defines the dollar value of each bundle
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 Food
 (1 -24, F)
 Technology
 Set (1 , 1)
 Labor 24 Leisuire
 Figure 1
 (1, f) as (pl, pf) * (1, f) = pil + pff. Given
 the price system (1, 1), the vector x =
 (1, f) maximizes the dollar value of
 supply at 24. Observe that (1, f) is not
 a unique maximizer of the dollar value
 of supply because each point of the north-
 east boundary of T has the same value.
 If the value of the supply action is dis-
 tributed to Robinson, then at prices (1, 1)
 he will be able to afford bundles with 1
 andf non-negative that satisfy the budget
 inequality pll + pff - 24. To maximize
 his utility Robinson demands (1, f), and
 so at prices (1, 1) the profit-maximizing
 supply and the utility-maximizing de-
 mand coincide. This is the unique equi-
 librium for the ADM model. Interpret-
 ing the technology set as that available
 to a competitive firm, and the economy
 as a private ownership one in which Rob-
 inson owns both the firm and the single
 scarce input labor, we can describe the
 equilibrium as such: At prices (1, 1) tak-
 ing these prices as given the firm maxi-
 mizes profit by purchasing 24 - 1 units
 of labor and producing 24 - 1 units of
 food. It pays 24 - 1 for the labor and
 sells the food for 24 - 1, which earns
 zero profit. From his ownership of the
 firm, Robinson receives no dividends.
 However, as a holder of labor resource
 he receives offers from the firm (24 - 1
 units) and from himself viewed as a con-
 sumer (I units) for all 24 units and thus
 earns an income of 24. As a consumer,
 Robinson uses his 24 units of income to
 purchase 1 units of leisure and f = 24
 - 1 units of food. Both markets clear,
 and all accounts balance.
 The interaction between markets
 above is explicit. For example, the wage
 determines the supply of labor and the
 demand for food through the relative
 price of leisure and food and the value
 of Robinson's initial endowment of labor.
 Developed with the classical theorems
 of welfare economics in mind, the ADM
 model of general equilibrium supplied
 precise conditions under which (a) equi-
 librium is efficient in the sense of Pareto
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 optimum, and (b) every Pareto optimum
 is an equilibrium after a suitable redistri-
 bution of ownership.
 We emphasize that the ADM model
 does not consider the plausibility of
 price-taking behavior. The model offers
 descriptions of perfect competition for
 situations in which bilateral monopoly
 (one consumer and one producer) or
 single agent maximization (Robinson)
 should apply.
 B. A Stylized Marshallian Model
 We begin with a familiar textbook fig-
 ure (Figure 2) where we have labeled
 average cost, marginal cost, and demand
 AC, MC, and FF respectively. All firms
 are identical and their number is fixed
 arbitrarily at 3. The aggregate supply is
 zero up to price p*(= minimum AC); at
 p* supply is the indicated four point set
 (with gaps of length y', the efficient scale,
 between the points), and above p* supply
 is the horizontal sum of the marginal cost
 curves.
 If additional firms can obtain the tech-
 nology represented by AC, then the ag-
 gregate supply shown is inconsistent with
 a situation in which profit-maximizing
 firms take prices as given. Note that at
 any price above p* any firm in the market
 may earn a positive profit, and so all firms
 S = supply at p*
 p with eight
 AC F active firms
 AC D D-demand at p*
 P* \Q2** .
 F
 . ,,
 M SD y
 Figure 3a.
 should be active.2 When each firm is
 maximizing profit (p = MC) and the num-
 ber of firms is such that firms have little
 incentive to enter or exit, we say that
 the market is in equilibrium.
 Marshall applies his model of perfect
 competition when efficient scale (mini-
 mum average cost output) is small rela-
 tive to demand. Another strong justifica-
 tion for the price-taking assumption is
 the fact that the horizontal gaps in the
 supply function at price p* are small rela-
 tive to demand. Here a particular num-
 ber of active firms who maximize profit
 leave insufficient incentive for other
 firms to enter. The price in the market
 will exceed slightly p*. Alternatively, we
 can consider an approximate equilibrium
 at price p*, in which a finite number of
 firms maximize profit by offering the effi-
 cient scale output to the market, and de-
 mand very nearly matches supply. This
 is illustrated in Figure 3a.
 In Figure 3b each firm achieves effi-
 cient scale at infinitesimal quantity M.
 We assume the existence of an un-
 bounded mass of available firms. Let D
 be demand at prices p*. Each firm pro-
 ducing at efficient scale M achieves an
 exact equilibrium at a mass DIM of active
 firms. Clearly Figure 3b represents a nat-
 ural limit of markets of the type consid-
 2 Clearly, with free entry, an exact price-taking
 equilibrium will exist only in the unlikely event that
 the value of demand at price p* is an integral multiple
 of the minimum average cost quantity.
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 AC p S = supply at p* with a mass DIM of
 F infinitesimal firms
 AC D = demand at p*
 . ~~~~~~~~.
 F
 M r'< S =D y
 Infinitesimal
 Scale
 Figure 3b.
 ered in Figure 3a as efficient scale be-
 comes small relative to demand. In the
 equilibrium of Figure 3b a continuum
 of firms produce.
 C. The Beginnings of the Synthesis
 Let us first place the Marshallian
 model in the framework of the ADM the-
 ory to demonstrate that the framework
 of the ADM theory captures the Marshal-
 lian ideas. The U-shaped average cost
 corresponds to the firm technology rep-
 resented in the second quadrant of Fig-
 ure 4. The efficient scale is (-M, M),
 corresponding to the minimum average
 cost point in partial equilibrium. We ob-
 tain the set of feasible aggregate produc-
 tion possibilities as follows. We start with
 an unbounded number of potential iden-
 tical firms (analogous to free entry), each
 with the given production technology.
 Suppose n firms are active at each level
 of input. Select the allocation of inputs
 among firms that yields the maximum ag-
 gregate output. Next vary n to obtain the
 maximum aggregate output given the
 level of input. Repeat this for each input
 level, to obtain the aggregate technology.
 Combine this with the initial endowment
 to construct T, the feasible set of aggre-
 gate supplies. Given the indifference
 curves depicted in the first quadrant of
 Figure 4, no price-taking equilibrium
 will obtain. Observe that the only price
 systems that lead to a positive output of
 food at a profit maximum take the form
 (p, p). (Without loss of generality we will
 assume p = 1.) If the input price exceeds
 the output price, active firms operate at
 a loss; therefore all firms are inactive and
 production is (0, 0), i.e., no input and
 no output. Alternatively if the output
 price exceeds the input price, each firm
 would make a positive profit by using
 M units of labor input to produce M units
 of food output. Hence all firms would
 be active, which requires an unbounded
 amount of labor. Thus for any price-tak-
 ing equilibrium with positive food pro-
 duction, input and output prices must
 be equal. At prices (1, 1) a consumer de-
 mands z, and each profit-maximizing firm
 supplies either (0, 0) or (-M, M). Hence
 aggregate supply (including the endow-
 ment) must take on one of the values
 [(24, 0), (24 - M, M), (24 - 2M, 2M)
 .]. In particular, the unique "best at-
 tainable point" x is not an equilibrium
 of the system.
 By limiting the number of firms to
 three (as in the Marshallian example), we
 can find a price system (1, 1 + E) at which
 supply equals demand and excluded
 firms have little incentive to enter. Fur-
 thermore, the associated allocation ap-
 proximates the "best point" x as illus-
 trated in Figure 5. Because the output
 price exceeds the input price, all three
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 firms supply a positive amount. Point z'
 in Figure 5 represents the price-taking
 aggregate production plan. His income
 from ownership of the labor resource,
 combined with his (positive) dividend
 from ownership of all three firms gives
 Robinson a budget line through z', which
 is his optimal choice. So aggregate supply
 equals aggregate demand.
 Alternatively, at prices (1, 1), we could
 consider an approximate price-taking
 equilibrium in which a finite number of
 firms produce positive quantities and
 maximize profit by offering the efficient
 scale output (-M, M). In this situation
 demand nearly matches supply. Figure
 4 essentially illustrates this where the gap
 between S3 and z is small. Once again de-
 mand almost equals the "best point" x.
 In Figure 6 the efficient scale of each
 firm is an infinitesimal quantity and there
 is an unbounded mass of available firms.
 As in the Marshallian Figure 3b, an ap-
 propriate mass of active firms achieves
 an exact equilibrium at prices (1, 1) at
 which each produces at efficient scale.
 Figure 6 represents a natural limit of
 markets of the type considered in Figure
 4 as the firms become small relative to
 the market. We point out the similarity
 with the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie econ-
 omy of Figure 1 where the equilibrium
 and the "best point" coincide.
 D. A Perfectly Competitive Economy
 We will apply the term perfectly
 competitive economy to a regime in
 which firms are arbitrarily small relative
 to their markets. We adopt the classical
 position that consumers have no market
 power. However, we could have pro-
 vided a similar treatment in which we
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 for a Firmi I1(,1+E
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 Labor -M 24 Leisure
 Figure 5.
 view consumers and firms symmetrically.
 As in Marshallian theory, we assume that
 firms can freely enter and experience in-
 creasing returns to scale over some range
 of output to formalize the notion of the
 firm's being small relative to its market.
 In Figures 2 and 4 three firms, each pro-
 ducing at efficient scale, nearly satisfy the
 demand of consumers when price equals
 minimum average cost. By adding an
 identical twin for each original consumer
 to replicate demand, it would take six
 firms producing at efficient scale to satisfy
 demand approximately at the same price.
 Continuing in this manner each firm can
 be made arbitrarily small relative to its
 market. A perfectly competitive econ-
 omy is a sequence of economies [E(ctk)]
 in which firms become arbitrarily small
 relative to their markets. In our formula-
 tion, Otk is a measure of firm size relative
 to the economy E(ak), and we let the
 size of the firm in our economy diminish,
 ack .> 0. We denote the limit of the se-
 quence by E(O) in which firms are infini-
 tesimal. With this interpretation the
 market in Figure 3b represents the limit
 of markets in Figure 3a. Similarly, the
 economy in Figure 6 is the limit of a
 sequence of economies in Figures 4 and
 5.
 In each economy of the sequence we
 will assume that firms correctly perceive
 the (typically non-negligible) effect on
 prices of their output, and maximize
 profit accordingly. Although nonconvexi-
 ties in the firms' production sets lead to
 generic nonexistence of price-taking
 equilibrium (i. e., nonexistence for all but
 "knife-edge" cases), Cournot equilibrium
 with entry frequently exists for the Mar-
 shallian model if efficient scale is small.
 This suggests that the limit of Cournot
 equilibria of [E(ak)] is a natural definition
 of an equilibrium for the perfectly com-
 petitive sequence [E(ak)]. In other
 words, we define perfectly competitive
 equilibrium as the limit of Cournot equi-
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 libria with entry as firms become small
 relative to the market.
 Not surprisingly we can characterize
 the perfectly competitive equilibria of
 the perfectly competitive sequence
 [E(ctk)] in terms of its limit economy E(O)
 in which firms are infinitesimal. In light
 of this characterization we will show that
 firms in perfectly competitive equilib-
 rium act "as if" they take prices as given
 in E(O). On the other hand, we will show
 that other price-taking equilibria of E(O)
 exist that are not the limit of Cournot
 equilibria with entry and thus not per-
 fectly competitive equilibria of the se-
 quence [E(ak)].
 Before continuing our exposition a his-
 torical note is in order. In their treatment
 of general equilibrium theory, Kenneth
 Arrow and Gerard Debreu (1954) con-
 cern themselves with the representation
 of the technology and behavior of the in-
 dividual firm. Lionel McKenzie (1959),
 however, speaks of a competitive con-
 stant returns to scale aggregate technol-
 ogy. McKenzie assumes forthrightly that
aggregate technology T is a convex cone,
 which follows from the additivity and di-
 visibility of basic production processes.3
 We say a production set has the additiv-
 ity property if for any two possible pro-
 duction plans the joint production plan
 is also feasible. It has the divisibility
 property if any production plan can be
 proportionately scaled down. Additivity
 is regarded as axiomatic when all factors
 that affect production are listed so that
 there can be no underlying fixed factor.
 3The assumption that T is a convex cone with ver-
 tex at the origin means that for any two production
 plans x, y in T, and for all non-negative numbers a,
 b, the production plan ax + by is also in T.
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 Divisibility might be thought of as analo-
 gous to the assumption that commodities
 are infinitely divisible. McKenzie does
 not explicitly mention firms, but we
 might regard them as producing outputs
 from inputs according to one of an infinity
 of basic processes. When efficient scale
 is infinitesimal relative to the economy,
 these processes can be expanded or con-
 tracted continuously in the aggregate by
 varying the mass of firms using each pro-
 cess, and this corresponds to the situation
 in E(O). Thus our foundations rest on the
 McKenzie interpretation of general equi-
 librium theory which we elaborate by ex-
 plicitly modeling firms and by providing
 Cournot-like foundations for competitive
 behavior.
 III. The Partial Equilibrium Synthesis
 An appropriate introduction to the no-
 tions of a perfectly competitive economy
 and perfectly competitive equilibrium is
 consideration of a partial equilibrium
 market. Besides being a natural stepping
 stone to our synthesis, it provides a rigor-
 ous foundation for the Marshallian the-
 ory. Explicitly, we establish the exis-
 tence of equilibrium for the partial
 equilibrium market without either the
 need for introducing the approximate
 equilibrium notions described above or
 infinitesimal firms. Furthermore, firms
 correctly perceive their influence on
 price.
 We first develop the notion of a per-
 fectly competitive sequence of partial
 equilibrium markets. This is a sequence
 of Marshallian markets for a single homo-
 geneous good where firms decrease in
 size. As suggested above, we define a
 perfectly competitive equilibrium as the
 limit of Cournot quantity setting equilib-
 ria-with-entry of the markets in the se-
 quence.
 Let us begin by returning to the Mar-
 shallian specification as in Figure 2. In
 order to simplify the analysis we assume
 some special structure for the cost func-
 tion C(y), namely that total costs are zero
 if production is zero while, if production
 is positive, costs consist of both strictly
 positive fixed costs CO and variable costs
 v. We assume variable costs increase
 with output at an increasing rate.
 (C) C(y) = O, if y = O, and C(y)=
 CO + v(y) if y > 0, where CO >
 0, and for all y ' 0, v' > 0,
 v" 0. We also assume average
 cost is minimized uniquely at
 y = 1.
 An inverse demand function F speci-
 fies demand by associating a price [F(y)]
 with an amount (y) placed on the market.
 We assume
 (F) F is twice continuously differenti-
 able and F(y) = C(1) implies F'(y)
 # 0.
 These are regularity conditions that en-
 able us to use the calculus in our analy-
 sis. (C, F) specifies the basic Marshallian
 market. We assume there is no bound
 on the number of firms with access to a
 particular cost function. This captures
 the idea of free entry. Of course in equi-
 librium, demand will limit the number
 of firms using a technology.
 A perfectly competitive sequence of
 markets [M(ak)] is a sequence of markets
 in which firms become small relative to
 the market. Let C be the cost function
 for a firm in market M(1). The corre-
 sponding average cost is ACI(y) = C(y)/
 y for y > 0. We take a representative
 sequence of markets by rescaling the av-
 erage cost functions: In market a, the
 output ay has the same average cost as
 output y in market 1. We can accomplish
 this by defining an a-size firm corre-
 sponding to C as a firm with cost function
 Ca(y) = aC(y/a). An a-size firm has aver-
 age cost ACj,(y) ACI(y/a), and attains
 minimum average cost uniquely at out-
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 put a. For each a > 0, C, and F, we
 consider a market with a countable infin-
 ity of firms with technology Ca, facing
 market inverse demand F. We denote
 this market by M(ot). As a -> 0, firms
 become small relative to the market, and
 the aggregate production possibilities
 converge to the constant returns to scale
 case diagrammed in Figures 3b and 6.
 Given the cost function- C and the inverse
 demand function F, we can define a per-
 fectly competitive sequence of markets
 by any sequence of strictly positive real
 numbers less than or equal to one, where
 the sequence, representing firm size,
 shrinks to zero. We denote the limit mar-
 ket by M(O). In particular, if the sequence
 of firm sizes is 1, 1/2, 1/3, . . . then the
 perfectly competitve sequence of mar-
 kets may be thought of as resulting from
 repeated replication of demand followed
 by the representation of output in per-
 capita (actually per-replication) units.
 Cournot equilibrium requires that the
 quantity actions of firms maximize profit
 given the quantity actions of all other
 firms. In equilibrium no firm makes neg-
 ative profit, because exit is possible and
 yields zero profit. Similarly, the assump-
 tion of an unbounded set of firms with
 access to the technology, only a finite
 number of which can be active (because
 of fixed costs), implies that in equilibrium
 no inactive firm can enter and make a
 positive profit. Stated precisely, a (pure
 strategy) Cournot equilibrium with entry
 for the market M(ot) is an integer n and
 a set of positive outputs (YI, Y2 . ..
 Yn) such that:
 (a) (YI, Y2, , Yn) is an n-firm Cour-
 not equilibrium (without entry);
 that is, for all i = 1, 2 . . ., n,
 F ( yj + Y)Yi - Co(yi) F
 ( Yj + YY- Ca(y) for all y '0.
 No active firm can choose another
 production plan y and earn greater
 profit given the production plans
 of all other active firms.
 (b) entry is not profitable; that is
 n
 F yj +Y)Y+ - Cj(y) ?0 for
 all y ' 0.
 Cournot equilibrium with entry is an "ex-
 act" equilibrium of the model where
 firms do not take prices as given. Individ-
 ually maximizing profit, firms (noncom-
 petitively) supply exactly the quantity
 demanded by consumers at the Cournot
 equilibrium price F(Y yj).
 Finally, we define the equilibrium out-
 put of the perfectly competitive se-
 quence [M(ak)] as the limit of YYi(tk)
 where [Y1(atk), * * *, Ynk (0)] is a Cour-
 not equilibrium with entry of the market
 M(ak). These are called perfectly com-
 petitive equilibria.
 Our definition of perfectly competitive
 equilibrium formalizes the idea that per-
 fect competition represents a limiting
 case of regimes in which firms can influ-
 ence price. Among economists interested
 in rigorous foundations our definition
 may not at first be acceptable. They ob-
 ject because some or all of the markets
 that form a perfectly competitive se-
 quence may lack a Cournot equilibrium.
 Hence our definition is meaningless. If
 demand is downward sloping, however,
 then a Cournot equilibrium exists even-
 tually in any sequence of markets [M(ak)]
 forming a perfectly competitive se-
 quence. By assuming that demand slopes
 downward our equilibrium concept will
 apply. Theorem 1 identifies the condi-
 tions "demand price equals minimum
 per unit cost" and "demand slopes down-
 ward" in the limit market M(0) as the
 characteristics of perfectly competitive
 equilibria for a sequence [M(ak)]. Free
 entry and exit determine the mass of ac-
 tive firms endogenously. Average cost
 curves are U-shaped (and so firm technol-
 ogy is not convex). The theory does not
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Thu, 21 Sep 2017 21:11:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1292 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXV (September 1987)
 assume price-taking behavior. Equilib-
 rium is exact, production equals demand,
 and all firms maximize profit.
 Theorem 1. (See Novshek 1980.)
 Given the cost function C satisfying (C),
 the inverse demand function F satisfying
 (F), and the perfectly competitive se-
 quence [M(ak)], the following conditions
 are equivalent:
 (la) y* is a perfectly competitive equi-
 librium for [M(ak)], and
 (lb) F(y*) = C(1) and F'(y*) < 0.
 For the case of partial equilibrium, the
 preceding result describes precisely our
 approach to perfect competition. Per-
 fectly competitive equilibria are the limit
 points of Cournot equilibria of the Mar-
 shallian markets [M(ak)].
 This theorem establishes that these
 perfectly competitive equilibrium quan-
 tities in M(0) equate the inverse demand
 price of consumers and minimum aver-
 age cost and satisfy downward-sloping
 demand. For the case of globally down-
 ward sloping demand, the perfectly com-
 petitive equilibria of the sequence
 [M(ak)] coincide with the unique Walra-
 sian equilibrium in the derived constant
 returns to scale market M(O). On the
 other hand, if inverse demand is not
 globally downward sloping,4 then there
 may be Walrasian equilibria of the de-
 rived (constant returns to scale in the ag-
 gregate) market M(O) that are not by our
 definition competitive equilibria. These
 equilibria fail because we require that
 entry and exit also be at rest.
 Figure 7 illustrates this point. In Fig-
 ure 7, the points y* and y** are equilibria
 of the perfectly competitive sequence
 [M(ak)], but A is not, even though the
 demand price of consumers and mini-
 mum average cost coincide at A. We ar-
 p F
 AC1/2(y) AC1(y)
 p* [1< '4 \F
 12 y y
 Figure 7.
 gue that A does not constitute an equilib-
 rium because an infinitesimal firm in
 M(O) can enter and make a positive profit.
 First, observe that in any Cournot equi-
 librium for the market M(ot) all firms
 make non-negative profit so aggregate
 output must lie in [0, y*] or [A, y**].
 Second, inactive firms must not profit by
 producing a, so aggregate Cournot equi-
 librium output plus a must lie in [yI, y]
 or [y**, oo)]. This implies that aggregate
 output must lie in either the interval [ y*
 - a, y*] or [y** - a, y**]. For small a
 neither interval is near A. In fact this is
 how one proves that la implies lb. The
 hard part of the theorem is to show that
 for a sufficiently small, if F(y*) = C(l)
 and F'(y*) < 0, then M(ot) has a Cournot
 equilibrium with entry with aggregate
 output in [y* - a, y*].
 The above argument highlights the dif-
 ferences of our equilibrium concept and
 the Walrasian equilibrium in the limit
 market. In the Walrasian theory firms
 take prices as given, and in perfect com-
 petition we justify this as an approxima-
 tion. The approximation applies so long
 as firms are small relative to their market
 and thereby have little influence in most
 any specification of strategic variables.
 Here the ability of each firm to affect
 price diminishes; however, in general
 each firm will have some influence that
 will affect the entry decision. If the entry
 of a firm will drive up price and make
 'This becomes a more interesting possibility when
 demand is a function of both price and wealth (which
 in turn depends on price as in the derivation of the
 supply of labor).
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 entry profitable, then inactive firms will
 take account of this effect and enter. In
 our model small firms correctly perceive
 their influence; therefore equilibrium re-
 quires that no firm can drive up prices
 by entering.
 IV. The General Equilibrium Model,
 Preliminaries
 In this section we discuss the general
 equilibrium model on which we base our
 concept of perfectly competitive equilib-
 rium. In the next section the model will
 be presented in the context of a simple
 example. This facilitates the exposition
 and should illustrate the close relation-
 ship between the partial equilibrium and
 general equilibrium models.
 A perfectly competitive sequence of
 economies [E(ot)] is analogous to a per-
 fectly competitive sequence of markets.
 As a converges to 0 firms become arbi-
 trarily small relative to the economy and
 in the limit economy, E(O), are infinitesi-
 mal. Each economy E(ot) has an un-
 bounded set of potential firms. This pro-
 vides our notion of free entry. In any
 equilibrium for E(ot) only a finite number
 of firms can be active, so inactive firms
 always exist and can test the profitability
 of entry. No firms enter if they cannot
 gain positive profit by doing so.
 In each economy E(ot), we use Cour-
 not-Nash equilibrium in quantities as our
 solution concept. As in Marshall, we treat
 consumers as a competitive, price-taking
 sector to focus on the role of firms and
 entry. In the Cournot tradition, quantity
 setting provides a tractable basis for our
 analysis and, as was the case in the partial
 equilibrium model, it avoids the obvious
 problem of nonexistence of equilibrium
 that arises when firms set prices in condi-
 tions of production under increasing re-
 turns. When firms consider a quantity
 action (a vector of input and output lev-
 els) they evaluate the corresponding
 profit using an "inverse demand" func-
 tion F. In the next section we will care-
 fully construct this function. The idea is
 this: To each vector of quantity actions
 of all firms, y, the "inverse demand"
 function associates a price vector, p, such
 that the competitive consumer sector's
 excess demand, given prices, p, and the
 income generated by the consumers' div-
 idend payments (their fraction of the
 profit or loss for each firm), exactly
 matches the aggregate quantity action of
 the firms. Thus the payoff for each firm
 is a well-defined function of its own pro-
 duction plan and the production plans
 of other firms. Although some firms may
 be making losses, for any vector of pro-
 duction plans employed by the firms,
 prices adjust so that all markets clear. A
 Cournot equilibrium exists if (1) each
 firm takes a feasible action in its produc-
 tion set; and (2) each firm maximizes prof-
 its given F and the actions of other firms.
 The assumption of nonconvex technolo-
 gies (the general equilibrium analog of
 U-shaped average cost) implies that only
 a finite number of firms have nonzero
 actions in equilibrium. Note that inactive
 firms are available but cannot make posi-
 tive profits by entry. Hence, the entry
 process is at rest in an equilibrium. Thus
 we have a description of Cournot equilib-
 rium with free entry for each economy
 E(ot).
 For each economy E(ot), consider the
 set of aggregate firm actions correspond-
 ing to Cournot equilibria of E(ot) relative
 to "inverse demand" F. We define the
 perfectly competitive equilibria of the se-
 quence of economies [E(ot)] to be the lim-
 its of Cournot equilibria of the E(ot) econ-
 omies. Explicitly, a price vector p* and
 an aggregate production vector y* form
 a perfectly competitive equilibrium of
 the sequence [E(ot)] provided that for an
 "inverse demand" selection F satisfying
 certain conditions, y* is the limit of a
 sequence [y (a)] as a converges to zero,
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 where y(a) is an aggregate production
 corresponding to a Cournot equilibrium
 of E(a) (relative to F). This coincides with
 the partial equilibrium model of Section
 III.
 The partial equilibrium results in Sec-
 tion III depended on a condition of
 downward sloping demand. The results
 for general equilibrium will depend on
 an analogous condition, called DSD.
 Prices determined by the "inverse de-
 mand" selection F must give proper en-
 try signals. At a point satisfying the ADM
 equilibrium conditions, additional entry
 must lead to new prices at which the en-
 trants make losses. Because input and
 output prices change, the DSD require-
 ment is that the net effect of all the price
 changes leads to a loss for the entrant.
 Walras had something similar to DSD
 in mind (Leon Walras [1874-77] 1954,
 p. 225):
 [U]nder free competition, if the selling price
 of a product exceeds the cost of the productive
 services for certain firms and a profit results,
 entrepreneurs will flow towards this branch of
 production or expand their output, so that the
 quantity of the product [on the market] will
 increase, its price will fall, and the difference
 between price and cost will be reduced; and,
 if [on the contrary], the cost of the productive
 services exceeds the selling price for certain
 firms, so that a loss results, entrepreneurs will
 leave this branch of production or curtail their
 output, so that the quantity of the product [on
 the market] will decrease, its price will rise
 and the difference between price and cost will
 again be reduced.
 In the next section we will see how
 our framework allows us to analyze a logi-
 cally precise general equilibrium model
 with nonconvex technologies where the
 number of active firms is determined en-
 dogenously and demand equals supply
 exactly. We do not assume price-taking
 behavior. Rather, when a converges to
 zero the ability of a firm to affect price
 becomes arbitrarily small. At any per-
 fectly competitive equilibrium of the se-
 quence, equilibrium production maxi-
 mizes profit relative to the equilibrium
 prices. We will show that the equilibria
 of the perfectly competitive sequence
 satisfy all the conditions of an ADM equi-
 librium of the limit economy E(O). Also,
 we will show that the classical welfare
 theorems still hold in our framework: ev-
 ery perfectly competitive equilibrium of
 the sequence is Pareto efficient and every
 Pareto efficient allocation for the se-
 quence can be supported as a perfectly
 competitive equilibrium of the sequence.
 V. The General Equilibrium Synthesis
 We adopted our general equilibrium
 model, with the exception of production
 sets (and our sequence of economies ap-
 proach), from the standard Arrow-De-
 breu-McKenzie model. The economies
 E(a) are composed of consumers and
 firms. Each consumer receives an initial
 endowment of goods and has preferences
 over potential bundles of goods. For ex-
 ample, the first two diagrams of Figure
 8 show representative indifference
 curves for two consumers, A and B, in
 an economy with two commodities, lei-
 sure and food, each of which can be con-
 sumed only in non-negative amounts.
 Both consumers prefer to consume the
 two commodities in fixed proportions,
 person A at 1: 1, person B at 1:2. A par-
 ticular utility function that assigns utility
 equal to the minimum of l and f to a
 bundle with l units of leisure and f units
 of food represents person A's prefer-
 ences. Similarly, one that assigns utility
 equal to the minimum of 21 and f to the
 bundle (1, f ) represents B's. They receive
 identical endowments of (1, 0), contain-
 ing one unit of leisure and no food.
 To construct a general equilibrium
 analog of U-shaped average cost and free
 entry we differ from the standard as-
 sumptions on the producer sector in two
 important ways. Each firm's production
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 Input
 Indifference Curves Indifference Curves Technology for a Single
 for A for B Firm in E(1), [{(0, 0), (-1, 1)}]
 Figure 8.
 set, the set of possible production plans
 for the firm,5 has two components. The
 first is the origin (the production plan
 with no inputs and no outputs) and the
 second component is bounded away from
 the origin, compact and strictly convex.
 By compact we mean there is some num-
 ber that is a bound for the magnitude
 of any input or output level in any feasi-
 ble production plan (boundedness), and
 if a sequence of feasible plans has a limit,
 the limit is also feasible (closedness). By
 strictly convex we mean that for any two
 production plans in this component, any
 weighted average of the two plans is in
 the interior of this component. See Fig-
 ure 9. This assumption provides a simple
 production set analog of U-shaped aver-
 age cost in partial equilibrium. Inclusion
 of the origin in the production set guaran-
 tees free exit. For our example we will
 use the simplest version of this type of
 production, an on-off technology. The
 third diagram of Figure 8 shows the tech-
 nology of a typical firm in E(1). The firm
 has only two options. It can be inactive
 with production plan (0, 0), or it can use
 one unit of leisure as labor input (nega-
 tive by convention) to produce one unit
 of food as output with production plan
 (-1, 1). Observe that the production set
 {(0, 0), (-1, 1)} contains all possible in-
 put-output vectors for the firm. The firm
 cannot scale the production level up or
 down to produce (-2, 2) or (-1/2, 1/2):
 there is an indivisibility in the production
 process at the firm level.
 Our model differs from the standard
 ADM one in a second way. We assume
 that there is free entry with no bound
 on the number of possible firms. Each
 economy has an infinity of potential
 firms; a countable infinity of firms exist
 in each economy E(ot), and a continuum
 of firms in the limit economy E(O). In
 the Cournot equilibria of E(ot) only a fi-
 nite number of firms operate so that there
 will always be additional firms to check
 the profitability of entry.
 By rescaling technologies in a manner
 analogous to the rescaling of cost in the
 partial equilibrium model of Section III,
 we generate a sequence of economies
 [E(a)] converging to a limit economy
 E(O). For our example, each E(ot) contains
 S Each production plan is a vector with a complete
 specification of all inputs and outputs for that plan.
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 Output
 Y 0
 Input
 Production Set
 Figure 9.
 a countable infinity of firms with produc-
 tion sets {(O, 0), (-ao, a)}. Note that a
 firm's technology is small relative to the
 economy when ao is small. The aggregate
 production set in E(ot) is {(0, 0), (-ot,
 a), (-2ao, 2a), . . .}: Aggregate produc-
 tion depends only on the number of ac-
 tive firms. The aggregate production set
 "converges" to the constant returns to
 scale technology that converts labor in-
 put into food output in the ratio 1:1. This
 constant returns to scale technology cor-
 responds to the aggregate production set
 in the limit economy E(O) with a contin-
 uum of infinitesimal firms. (As a closed,
 convex set this limit aggregate produc-
 tion set satisfies standard ADM assump-
 tions for the production set of a single
 firm.)
 For simplicity the consumer sectors of
 each E(ot) and E(O) coincide, and con-
 sumer i owns a fraction of firm t indepen-
 dent of the firm (i.e., if Oit is the fraction
 of t owned by i, then Oit = Oi for all t).
 In our example consumer A owns fraction
 OA of each firm while consumer B owns
 1 - OA of each firm. Let 0A = 3/4. Thus
 E(a) "converges" to the limit economy
 E(O) in terms of both consumer and pro-
 ducer sectors.
 In order to define a Cournot equilib-
 rium in E(ot) we need a general equilib-
 rium analog of a partial equilibrium in-
 verse demand function so that firms can
 evaluate the profits corresponding to dif-
 ferent actions. There is an important dif-
 ference between partial and general
 equilibrium inverse demand functions.
 In partial equilibrium, dollar incomes re-
 main constant while a single price varies.
 In contrast, the general equilibrium in-
 verse demand function takes full account
 of the induced changes in income,
 through both changes in the value of en-
 dowments and in the received dividend
 payments.
 The assumption of equality across firms
 of each consumer's ownership share im-
 plies that each consumer's wealth de-
 pends only on prices p and aggregate pro-
 duction y, and not on the arrangement
 of production among firms. If consumer
 i owns fraction Oi of each firm and has
 endowment vector wi, then at prices p
 and the aggregate production y the con-
 sumer receives dividend payment Oi P -
 y and has total income p * wi + Oi p y.
 (Because inputs are negative in y, the
 sum of individual prices times planned
 inputs or outputs is just the firm's profit
 at plan y given prices p.) If his corre-
 sponding vector of demand is Di(p, p -
 wi + Oi p - y) then the excess demand
 D of the consumer sector (the sum of
 individual consumer's gross demands,
 minus the sum of resources owned as ini-
 tial endowments by the consumer sector)
 is the function D = 2 Di(p, p * wi + Oi
 p y) - wi. An "inverse demand"
 selection F(y) is a function from aggregate
 production vectors y to price vectors
 F(y) that clear markets given the action
 of firms: E Di[F(y), F(y) - wi + Oi
 F(y) - y] - wi = y. This is the gen-
 eral equilibrium analog of partial equilib-
 rium inverse demand. The correspond-
 ing partial equilibrium version as used
 in standard oligopoly theory would fix the
 income of consumer i at Ii rather than
 recognize that price changes affect in-
 come [F(y) - wi + Oi F(y) - y]. Even after
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 price normalization several price vectors
 may clear markets given y. We assume
 F selects one of the price vectors.
 We now illustrate an inverse demand
 function in terms of our example. Every
 feasible aggregate production plan as-
 sumes the form (-t, t) where t is non-
 negative. Normalizing prices to sum to
 one (because only relative prices matter)
 the price vector is of the form (1 - p,
 p) where p lies between zero and one.
 With aggregate production (-t, t) and
 price (1 - p, p) consumer A has income
 (1 - p, p) - (1, 0) + (3)(1 - p, p)
 (-t, t) = 1 - p + (3/4)t (2p - 1) and
 consumer B has income (1 -p, p) - (1,
 0) + (1/4)(1 - p, p) - (-t, t) = 1 - p +
 (1/4)t (2p - 1). If p is strictly between
 zero and one then consumer A has de-
 mand vector (IA, IA) and consumer B has
 demand vector [IB/(l + p), 2lB/(1 + P)]
 where Ii is the income of consumer i (re-
 call Figure 8).
 The "inverse demand" F(-t, t) for the
 example must yield prices that, together
 with the resulting incomes, generate ag-
 gregate excess demand (-t, t) in the con-
 sumer sector, to match exactly the aggre-
 gate production plan. Solving for F we
 find
 F(-t, t) =
 (0, 1) 0? t < 16/15
 [(15t - 16)/(6t - 4), 16/ S t s 4 [y12J- 9t)/(6t - )]164? ?
 (1, 0) 4/3< t s 2.
 Observe that the inverse demand func-
 tion depends on preferences and the ini-
 tial distribution of wealth in the econ-
 omy. In particular, when we consider a
 sequence of economies [E(oa)], the in-
 verse demand function is independent
 of a.
 Using "inverse demand" F, firms de-
 termine an equilibrium for E(ot) just as
 in the partial equilibrium case. In general
 equilibrium the firms pick production
 plans to maximize profit, taking the pro-
 duction plans of all other firms as fixed.
 Free exit implies that in equilibrium no
 firm operates at a loss. Also, no inactive
 firm has an incentive to enter. Stated
 precisely, a Cournot equilibrium with
 entry for economy E(ot) (relative to "in-
 verse demand" F) is an integer n, the
 number of active firms, and a set of
 nonzero production plans (yl, Y2,
 Yn) such that:
 (a) (Yl, Y2* , Yn) is an n-firm Cour-
 not equilibrium (without entry);
 that is, for all i = 1, 2, . . ., n,
 yi is a feasible production plan and
 F ( Yj + Yi) * Yi 2 F( yi +
 y) * y for all feasible y, and
 (b) entry is not profitable; that is
 F(2 yj + y) * y ? 0 for all
 feasible y.
 Let F be a (continuous) "inverse de-
 mand" function for the economy E(1).
 We define a perfectly competitive equi-
 librium for the sequence of economies
 [E(ot)] as a price vector p* and an aggre-
 gate production plan y* such that (1)
 F(y*) = p* and (2) y* is the limit of aggre-
 gate production plans y(a) corresponding
 to Cournot equilibria with entry for econ-
 omies E(ot) (relative to F). Observe that
 every specification of perfectly competi-
 tive equilibrium includes an underlying
 inverse demand function.
 In our example, the use of the on-off
 technology greatly simplifies the analysis
 when looking for an equilibrium of the
 sequence: Each firm's profit depends
 only on whether it operates and the total
 number of active firms. In E(ot), N active
 firms result in each active firm receiving
 profit ao if N < 16/150t, ao(14 - 12Not)/(3Not
 - 2) if 16/150a C N ? 4/3ao, and -a if 4/3ao
 < N. Inactive firms always have profit
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 zero. To be a Cournot equilibrium each
 active firm must have non-negative
 profit, so in equilibrium N ' 7/6ao. On
 the other hand, in Cournot equilibrium
 inactive firms must not have an incentive
 to be active, so in equilibrium N + 1 2
 7/6ao. Each E(ot) has a Cournot equilibrium
 with N(ot) active firms where N(ot) is the
 integer between (7/6a) - 1 and 7/6ao (when
 7/6ao is an integer there are two values of
 N that work). The aggregate production
 plan in the Cournot equilibrium is
 N(a)(-ao, a) which differs from (-7/6, 7/6)
 by no more than ao units of input and ao
 units of output. Thus in our example,
 p* = (1/2, 1/2) and y* = (-7/6, 7/6) is a
 perfectly competitive equilibrium for the
 sequence of economies [E(ot)]. At these
 prices consumer A chooses (1/2, 1/2), con-
 sumer B chooses (1/3, 2/3), and supply
 equals demand. Note that this agrees
 with the ADM equilibrium of the limit
 economy E(O).
 Next we would like to prove the first
 classical theorem of welfare economics:
 Perfectly competitive equilibria for the
 sequence [E(ot)] are efficient in the sense
 of Pareto. We begin by defining a Pareto
 efficient allocation for the perfectly com-
 petitive sequence [E(ot)]. First observe
 the way in which the sequence [E(ot)]
 converges to E(O): The demand sectors
 of each E(ot) coincide with the demand
 sector in the limit economy E(O), and the
 aggregate production sets in E(ot) con-
 verge to the constant returns to scale ag-
 gregate production set in the limit econ-
 omy E(O). As a consequence we define
 efficiency for the perfectly competitive
 sequence [E(ot)] partially in terms of the
 limit economy E(O).
 A vector listing the consumption of
 each consumer and an aggregate produc-
 tion plan is called an allocation; if it is
 feasible for E(O) then we say it is feasible
 for the sequence [E(ot)]. Feasibility re-
 quires that aggregate consumption differ
 from aggregate production by exactly the
 aggregate endowment and also that ag-
 gregate production belong to the con-
 stant returns to scale aggregate produc-
 tion set of the limit economy E(O). An
 allocation for the perfectly competitive
 sequence [E(ot)] Pareto dominates an al-
 ternative allocation if it makes at least
 one consumer better off while leaving the
 remaining consumers at least as well off.
 A feasible allocation for the sequence
 [E(oa)] is Pareto efficient if no feasible allo-
 cation Pareto dominates it.
 Proposition. Equilibria of the per-
 fectly competitive sequence [E(oa)] are
 Pareto efficient.
 The standard argument for this result,
 applied to our example, proceeds as fol-
 lows. Recall that the perfectly competi-
 tive equilibrium for the sequence [E(oa)]
 has corresponding allocation (1/2, 1/2) for
 A, (1/3, 2/3) for B, and aggregate produc-
 tion plan (-7/6, 7/6) that yields zero profit
 at prices (1/2, 1/2). This means that A sup-
 plies one-half of a unit of leisure (as labor
 input to the production process) and con-
 sumes one-half of a unit of food, while
 B supplies two-thirds of a unit of leisure
 and consumes two-thirds of a unit of food.
 In order to prove the proposition we
 must show that any allocation that Pareto
 dominates the equilibrium allocation is
 not feasible.
 The set of bundles that A considers
 at least as good as (1/2, 1/2) is XA = {1,
 f)ll ? 1/2, f ? 1/2}. Similarly, XB = {1,
 f)ll ? 1/3, f 2 2/3}. To make one of A
 and B better off while keeping the other
 at least as well off would require in excess
 of 5/6 units of leisure and in excess of 7/6
 units of food. But with only two units of
 leisure available in the economy, more
 than 7/6 units of food must be produced
 from less than 7/6 (= 2 -5/6) units of labor.
 One can see immediately that such a pro-
 duction plan is not feasible with the one
 unit of food for each unit of labor constant
 returns to scale aggregate production set
 of the limit economy E(O).
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 In general, we must use a less direct
 argument to show that a Pareto-dominat-
 ing allocation a is not feasible. We com-
 bine the observation that, relative to the
 price system (1/2, 1/2), the production plan
 that matches aggregate net consumption
 in a must yield a greater profit than does
 (-7/6, 7/6) with the fact that (-7/6, 7/6) is
 profit maximal in E(O).
 What are the properties of equilibria
 of the perfectly competitive sequence
 [E(ot)]? How are these equilibria related
 to the ADM (price-taking) equilibria of
 the limit economy E(O)? The answers
 agree with the partial equilibrium results
 of Theorem 1: The equilibria of the per-
 fectly competitive sequence are those
 ADM equilibria of the limit economy that
 satisfy an additional condition, DSD.
 This condition is related to downward
 sloping demand in the partial equilib-
 rium case.
 Consider an equilibrium of the per-
 fectly competitive sequence (p*, y*) rela-
 tive to the "inverse demand" function,
 F. In E(ot), a firm has a production set
 comprised of two components, the no-
 production component and the produc-
 tion one and the "inverse demand" func-
 tion is continuous in a neighborhood of
 y*. In our example the latter component
 of the production set contained the single
 production plan, (-ao, a). Though we did
 not assume price-taking behavior, as ao
 converges to zero a firm's ability to affect
 price becomes arbitrarily small. For ao
 > 0 the entry or exit of firms has an effect
 on price. In the limit this effect disap-
 pears and the aggregate production plan
 y* must maximize profit over the aggre-
 gate production set (a constant returns
 to scale cone) relative to prices p*, and
 must satisfy p* - y* = 0. (Because "in-
 verse demand" is continuous near y*,
 and the aggregate productions in the se-
 quence of Cournot equilibria converge
 to y*, if p* - y* > 0 then, for small ao,
 some feasible action for a firm in E(a)
 would earn strictly positive profit at the
 Cournot equilibrium despite the price
 change due to entry by a single firm.
 Hence all firms should be active. Simi-
 larly, if p* - y* < 0 then some active
 firms in the Cournot equilibria of E(oa)
 make a loss, and should exit. If p* * y*
 = 0 but p* - y > 0 for some y in the
 aggregate production set then again some
 firms could not have been maximizing
 in E(ot).) By an interchangeability lemma6
 (see Koopmans 1957, p. 13) adjusted for
 the fact that in the limit there is a contin-
 uum of firms, any decomposition of y*
 into feasible actions for the individual in-
 finitesimal firms in E(O) is such that all
 firms' actions must be profit maximizing
 over their production sets relative to
 prices p*. Thus the actions of firms are
 as if they are price takers in equilibrium,
 and an equilibrium of the perfectly com-
 petitive sequence is an ADM equilib-
 rium of the limit economy E(O).
 A slight modification of our example
 demonstrates the differences between
 the requirement that in the limit firms
 are unable to influence price, and the
 assumption of price-taking behavior. The
 equilibria of the perfectly competitive se-
 quence must satisfy an additional condi-
 tion, (weak) DSD. The DSD condition
 is necessary to ensure equilibrium in the
 entry decision. As a converges to zero,
 in the sequence of economies [E(ot)] firms
 become arbitrarily small relative to the
 market and thus have arbitrarily small
 impact on prices. Therefore, any produc-
 tion plan y in aY with p* - y < 0 would
 not (for a sufficiently small) be able to
 change price enough to make a non-nega-
 tive profit. Because max p* - y = p* -
 6 The interchangeability lemma of Koopmans states
 that if one maximizes separately a linear functional
 on two sets A and B then its maximum value on
 A + B is simply the sum of the previous maximums.
 In less mathematical terms it states that centralized
 planning yields the same results as decentralized
 planning.
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 y* = 0, no actions aoy in aoY with p* - y
 > 0 are available. In our example, when
 an inactive firm becomes active it
 changes price by approximately at[dF/
 dy(y)] (-1, 1)' where [dF/dy(y)] is the 2
 x 2 matrix of partial derivatives. Because
 an active firm produces a(-1, 1), the en-
 trant's profit minus the incumbent's
 profit before this additional entry is ap-
 proximately aL2 (-1, 1) [dF/dy(y)] (-1, 1)'.
 For the case of n commodities, the ex-
 pression at2y' [dF/dy(y*)]y is (approxi-
 mately) the profit differential (above the
 profit made by an active firm before this
 additional entry) available to an inactive
 firm by switching to aoy in aoY with p* -
 y = 0 in the E(oa) equilibrium. Weak
 DSD requires that this profit differential
 be nonpositive. When weak DSD fails,
 inactive firms could not be profit maxi-
 mizing for ao sufficiently small. Thus firms
 would want to enter in E(oa), and y* could
 not be a limit point of any sequence of
 equilibria of E(oa) relative to F.
 The DSD requirement, a static stabil-
 ity condition, is similar in spirit to Hick-
 sian perfect stability (John Hicks 1939).
 Each considers changes in a single "mar-
 ket" at a time. Hicksian perfect stability
 requires that a fall in the price of a single
 commodity make demand exceed supply
 for that commodity (with or without other
 prices adjusting to clear other markets).
 The DSD condition applies to a change
 in the number of active firms of a particu-
 lar type, with the corresponding change
 in aggregate production being a simulta-
 neous change in several input and output
 commodities. Prices adjust to clear all
 markets given the new aggregate produc-
 tion. DSD requires that the profit for
 firms declines as more firms enter. Static
 equilibrium of the perfectly competitive
 sequence requires DSD.
 We can demonstrate the consequences
 of failure of weak DSD in a slightly modi-
 fied version of our example. Consider an
 example in which consumer A owns one-
 fourth rather than three-fourths of each
 firm. For some aggregate production
 more than one price vector would clear
 the market, so the "inverse demand" F
 must be a selection from these prices.
 In particular let us examine the ADM
 equilibrium p* = (1/2, '/2), y* = (-/6,
 7/6) which is unchanged because there are
 zero profits in that equilibrium. Taking
 the "inverse demand" with F[(-7/6, 7/6)]
 = (1/2, 1/2) and which is continuous near
 the ADM equilibrium y*, we obtain
 F[(-t, t)] = [(16 - 13t)/(4 - 2t), (llt -
 12)/(4 - 2t)] for 12/i1 ' t ' 16/13. Notice
 that p* = (1/2, 1/2), y* = (-7/6, 7/6) cannot
 be an equilibrium for the perfectly com-
 petitive sequence [E(ot)]: No Cournot
 equilibrium for any small ao has aggregate
 production corresponding to t near 7/6.
 Such a Cournot equilibrium would re-
 quire the number of active firms, N, to
 be between 12/loat and 16/A3a. In that re-
 gion each active firm earns a(12Nao -
 14)/(2 - Na), which is negative for N
 < 7/6ao. For N ?-7/6ao, by engaging in pro-
 duction, an inactive firm changes from
 zero to strictly positive profit. Cournot
 equilibria cannot exist near p* = (1/2, 1/2),
 y* = (-7/6, 7/6) for any small ao because
 weak DSD fails. The ADM equilibrium
 for E(O) is not an equilibrium for the per-
 fectly competitive sequence [E(a)].
 Prices give the wrong entry signals in
 this example because of the general equi-
 librium income effects in E(ot). The entry
 of an additional firm will result in a lower
 price for labor relative to food yielding
 profit for the entering firm. The neces-
 sary additional labor is obtained by low-
 ering the wage. Because A owns only a
 small fraction of each firm, the reduction
 in the value of his leisure endowment
 (as labor) dominates his extra dividend
 (all active firms have strictly greater
 profit after the entry of an additional firm)
 and his income falls. Thus he reduces
 his demand for both leisure and food
 equally. On the other hand B owns a
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 large fraction of each firm, and his larger
 dividend dominates the reduction in
 value of his leisure endowment. Con-
 sumer B receives a larger income and
 demands both more leisure and more
 food, but in the ratio 1: 2. The extra labor
 needed for production by the entrant and
 to compensate for reduced labor by B
 comes from A. B consumes the extra food
 produced and the extra food available be-
 cause of the reduced demand by A.
 Though each consumer and firm is well
 behaved in a partial equilibrium sense,
 the general equilibrium income effects
 lead to an analog of upward sloping de-
 mand providing wrong entry signals.
 The second welfare theorem is a more
 difficult theorem in our context. Accord-
 ing to the ADM second welfare theorem,
 under suitable assumptions, every Pareto
 efficient allocation can be supported as
 an ADM equilibrium by redistributing
 wealth; however, not every ADM equi-
 librium of the limit economy E(O) is an
 equilibrium of the perfectly competitive
 sequence [E(ot)]. In our context we must
 redistribute initial endowments and own-
 ership shares so that prices give correct
 entry signals (DSD holds). Otherwise,
 entry and exit might not cease near the
 Pareto efficient allocation, and therefore
 that allocation would not be a limit of
 Cournot equilibria of E(ot), that is, an
 equilibrium of the perfectly competitive
 sequence [E(ot)].
 Despite the extra difficulties imposed
 by the requirement that prices give cor-
 rect entry signals, it remains true that
 under rather general conditions (such as
 no externalities) a Pareto efficient alloca-
 tion can be supported as an equilibrium
 of a perfectly competitive sequence. To
 do so, the redistribution of endowments
 and ownership shares must not only gen-
 erate the required wealth level for each
 consumer but also ensure that prices give
 correct entry signals.
 Proposition. For every Pareto efficient
 allocation of the perfectly competitive se-
 quence [E(ot)], there exists a redistribu-
 tion of ownership and initial endowments
 so that this allocation is a perfectly com-
 petitive equilibrium for the sequence
 [E'(ot)] obtained from [E(ot)] by the redis-
 tribution.
 We can demonstrate this result in
 terms of our example. The first step is
 to find all Pareto efficient allocations. Set
 a utility level us for consumer A. Maxi-
 mize the utility of B subject to the con-
 straints that the leisure-food allocation to
 A yields utility level at least us, and the
 allocation to A and B is feasible given
 their aggregate initial endowment and
 the constant returns to scale technology
 of the aggregate production set of E(O).
 Vary the utility level assigned to con-
 sumer A to trace out all Pareto efficient
 allocations.
 By the nature of consumer A's prefer-
 ences (recall Figure 8), his utility de-
 pends on the minimum of the amounts
 of leisure and food he obtains. If his allo-
 cation has different amounts of leisure
 and food, then the excess amount of one
 above the other is wasted. Because that
 excess added to B's bundle might in-
 crease the utility of consumer B, it should
 be clear that for this special example we
 can fix consumer A's bundle, with equal
 amounts of leisure and food, rather than
 fixing his utility level. If A receives bun-
 dle (1 - d, 1 - d), then a total of 2 -
 2d units of leisure are used (including
 the 1 - d units to produce the food con-
 sumed by A) so 2d units of leisure re-
 main. The problem is to maximize B's
 utility given those 2d units of leisure and
 the technology that turns labor into food
 in a 1: 1 ratio. Any bundle (2d - f, f )
 with f between zero and 2d can be as-
 signed to B, and the problem resembles
 a standard partial equilibrium consumer
 choice problem (see Figure 10) with solu-
 tion (1, f ) = (2d/3, 4d/3). As d varies be-
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Thu, 21 Sep 2017 21:11:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1302 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXV (September 1987)
 Food f =21
 2d  /
 /
 4d/3 ,
 'I\
 'I\
 2d/3 2d Leisure
 Figure 10.
 tween zero and one we trace out all Par-
 eto efficient allocations, with d = 0 corre-
 sponding to B's receiving nothing, and
 d = 1 corresponding to A's receiving
 nothing. Observe that as d varies, the
 aggregate production (-1 - d/3, 1 +
 d/3) also varies.
 With constant returns to scale technol-
 ogy, every ADM equilibrium will have
 zero profit and prices p* = (1/2, 1/2). Thus
 the Pareto efficient allocations can be
 supported as ADM equilibrium of E(O)
 only by assigning ownership of 2 - 2d
 units of the aggregate leisure endowment
 to A and the remaining 2d units to B.
 This generates the required wealth levels
 so that each consumer can purchase the
 appropriate bundle with prices (1/2, 1/2).
 The ownership share of firms is irrelevant
 for the ADM equilibria.
 To support these Pareto efficient allo-
 cations as equilibria of a perfectly compe-
 titive sequence [E'(ot)] we must also as-
 sign ownership of 2 - 2d units of the
 aggregate leisure endowment to A and
 2d units to B in order to generate appro-
 priate wealth levels. However, we must
 also assign the ownership share of the
 firms so that prices give the correct entry
 signals in E(ot). The equilibrium corre-
 sponding to d must have aggregate pro-
 duction (-1 - d/3, 1 + d/3) and prices
 p* = (1/2, 1/2). Solving for the "inverse
 demand" selection F which is continuous
 near (-1 - d/3, 1 + d/3) and satisfies
 F[(-1 - d/3, 1 + d/3)] = (1/2, 1/2) we
 obtain
 F[(-t,t)] = [(3t+Ot-4)/(2d+20t-2),
 (2d + Ot - 3t + 2)/(2d + 20t - 2)]
 for t near 1 + d/3 where 0 is the fraction
 of each firm owned by consumer A. In
 E(ac), when aggregate output is near (-1
 - d/3, 1 + d/3) the entry of an additional
 firm changes the profit of each active firm
 by approximately (-ao, a) aF/at [(-1 -
 d/3, 1 + d/3)] ot = -90t2/(Od + 30 + 3d
 - 3) (t changes by ao when a firm enters)
 which must be negative for DSD to hold.
 To give correct entry signals, we must
 redistribute ownership shares so that
 consumer A owns fraction 0 > 3(1 - i)!
 (d + 3) of each firm. This is possible for
 each Pareto efficient allocation corre-
 sponding to a d value greater than zero.
 That this can be done in general depends
 on a revealed preference argument.7
 It is important to observe that our ver-
 sion of the second welfare theorem re-
 quires more flexibility of transfers than
 the corresponding ADM result (Debreu
 1959, p. 95). In that theory all of the
 required redistribution can be achieved
 by means of a single commodity, which
 may be thought of as "government wealth
 transfer." Here more than a single com-
 modity may need to be redistributed be-
 cause the allocation of all of the endow-
 ments is important, not just the
 purchasing power. Leonid Hurwicz
 (1959) refers to the property that every
 7At d = 0 we hit the constraint 0 ' 1. With d =
 O and 0 = 1 we have essentially a one-person econ-
 omy; consumer A owns all the aggregate endowment
 and all of the firms. Because of the kink in the indif-
 ference curves in our special example, F cannot be
 made continuous near (-1, 1) for this case. Thus in
 this case there is a Pareto efficient allocation that
 cannot be achieved as a perfectly competitive equilib-
 rium of a sequence [E'(CL)]; however, this is an artifact
 of the fact that preferences are not differentiable.
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 optimum is an equilibrium (after redistri-
 bution) as "unbiasedness." Our analysis
 suggests a bias of the competitive mecha-
 nism beyond that which government
 transfers can correct. This bias can be
 corrected, but the correction in general
 requires more than the redistribution of
 a single commodity. From the viewpoint
 presented here, the competitive mecha-
 nism has the bias that it can seek out
 only those optima that, with the means
 of transfer at hand, give the necessary
 entry signals.
 VI. Dynamics
 Marshall and Walras examined a long-
 run equilibrium in which all factors vary
 freely and "flow toward that branch of
 production" where they can realize prof-
 its. In the short run the returns to fixed
 factors do not necessarily equalize. At
 each moment, prices clear markets, but
 these prices reflect only the relative scar-
 city of the variable factors. Walras de-
 scribed the process from which these
 prices derive by a tatonnement.
 In each E(ox) firms correctly perceive
 the prices, F(y), that will prevail given
 any aggregate production y. Thus our
 analysis presupposes an anticipated ad-
 justment of prices to clear markets, a a-
 tonnement for the exchange economy
 generated by a fixed production vector
 y. In each Cournot equilibrium firms an-
 ticipate that the price vector F(y) will re-
 sult from production y. At the equilib-
 rium the prevailing price is the right
 price; that is, it equates supply and de-
 mand. Thus, no firm actually changes
 output in an equilibrium. We could have
 assumed that firms formed a subjective
 F(y), but we required that F(y) actually
 clear markets. For our model of dynamics
 we assume that the adjustment of prices
 to clear markets is instantaneous relative
 to the speed at which firms are able to
 change production levels.
 Following the standard Marshallian
 framework, we next consider the quan-
 tity adjustments of a fixed number of ac-
 tive firms to achieve a short-run equilib-
 rium. In E(ot) we assume a continuous
 Cournot dynamics. Assuming all other
 firms' outputs are fixed, each active firm
 changes its output continuously. In the
 limit economy E(O), each firm is infinites-
 imal and this dynamics agrees with that
 generated by firms viewing price as fixed.
 In both E(O) and E(ot) the firms do not
 account for the adjustments of other firms
 or the changing of price over time. We
 prohibit exit in the short run, so that an
 active firm cannot produce zero. It must
 produce from the nonzero component of
 its production set (e.g., some inputs may
 be fixed in the short run so that even if
 all outputs are zero some inputs are
 used). If F is continuously differentiable
 and ot is small, then the firm has little
 effect on price. Thus the incentives and
 behavior of the firm in the short-run dy-
 namic for E(ot) "converge to" that in the
 short-run dynamic for E(O).
 We build a bridge between the short
 run and the long run in the following
 manner. For concreteness, let us refer
 to the fixed factor as entrepreneurship.
 After each short-run adjustment we as-
 sume that entrepreneurship flows toward
 higher profits; that is, the number of ac-
 tive firms in each industry changes be-
 cause of their profitability. Following
 such a period of factor movement, a new
 short-run equilibrium arises with associ-
 ated prices, which lead to new incentives
 for factors to move, and so on. From
 this standpoint the tatonnement occurs
 quickly relative to the short-run quantity
 adjustment of firms, which in turn takes
 place faster than the entry and exit ad-
 justment of the entrepreneurial factor.
 As in the short-run adjustment, in E(ot),
 recognizing only their own effect on
 price, firms enter or leave, so again, in
 E(O) this entry dynamic agrees with that
 generated by viewing price as fixed. In
 both the short and long run, firms behave
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 myopically. The entry-exit decision is a
 choice of production set oxY or {O} (recall
 Figure 9). If F is continuously differenti-
 able and ot is small, then the firm's deci-
 sion has little effect on price. Thus the
 incentives and behavior of the firm in
 the long-run dynamic for E(ot) "converge
 to" that in the long-run dynamic for E(O).
 The DSD condition suggests a dy-
 namic theory of convergence to the long-
 run equilibrium, in which the realign-
 ment of the entrepreneurial factor plays
 a significant role. Because DSD is a nec-
 essary condition for equilibrium of the
 perfectly competitive sequence [E(ot)],
 no infinitesimal firm in E(O) can enter
 with positive profit at an equilibrium.
 However, we can conceive of a model
 where out of a long-run equilibrium the
 entry and exit of firms in a sector is pro-
 portional to the returns to the entrepre-
 neurial factor available there. This leads
 us to consider the stability of the equilib-
 rium introduced in the previous sections.
 It relates to the questions of whether re-
 turns to the homogeneous entrepreneu-
 rial factors tend to equalize and whether
 myopic profit-seeking behavior moves an
 economy toward a Pareto optimum. In
 addition, it is relevant to the viability of
 a planning procedure in which central
 planners increase production in the most
 profitable sectors.
 Our previous argument that when at
 is small, both the short- and long-run dy-
 namics in E(ot) will be similar to the dy-
 namics in E(O) assures us that we lose
 no generality by examining E(O) alone.
 Hence, for simplicity we will discuss the
 dynamics in terms of the limit economy
 E(O). Our three stages of dynamics are
 as follows:
 1. instantaneous adjustment of prices
 to clear markets given any aggregate
 production y;
 2. output adjustment by a fixed num-
 ber (mass) of firms, each viewing
 price as fixed at each instant, to
 reach a short-run equilibrium; and
 3. entry and exit at a rate proportional
 to the (firm) profit levels in each
 industry to reach a long-run equilib-
 rium.
 The partial equilibrium market M(O)
 used in Section III adequately illustrates
 the dynamics that we have in mind. We
 add to the hypotheses from that section
 the condition that F is nonincreasing and
 there exists a unique y* such that F(y*)
 = C(1). In this case there is a unique
 equilibrium.
 Introduction of the dynamics is as fol-
 lows. For each aggregate output y, F(y)
 gives market-clearing prices, the adjust-
 ment process of which is stable because
 F is nonincreasing. In the short run an
 active firm must produce a positive quan-
 tity whether or not the positive profit-
 maximizing action yields positive profit.
 Each active firm increases output when-
 ever the current price exceeds the mar-
 ginal cost at the current output level and
 decreases output when current marginal
 cost exceeds price. This adjustment is
 also stable because F is nonincreasing
 and all firms have nondecreasing mar-
 ginal cost. For each mass of active firms
 L,u the short-run equilibrium price associ-
 ated with ,u, p(,u), is determined as fol-
 lows:
 1. Supply, S[p(,u)], is the integral of
 the profit-maximizing actions of the
 ,u active firms at price p(,u), and
 2. F[S(p(pi)] = p(pi); that is, the inverse
 demand of supply at p(,u) is p(,u),
 or short-run supply equals demand
 at p(,u).
 Let ur(pi) denote the profit of each ac-
 tive firm when there are ,u active firms
 in short-run equilibrium. If DSD holds,
 then a mass of active firms ,u less than
 (greater than) the mass of active firms
 in the equilibrium of the perfectly com-
 petitive sequence receives positive (neg-
 ative) profit. Thus in this case the long-
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 run equilibrium is globally stable under
 the long-run adjustment process: dlidt
 = 'rr(pu). Let us pause to interpret this.
 Suppose that we start with the initial
 mass of active firms ,u(O). The prices,
 p[,u(O)], provide signals for entry. Over
 time the mass of active firms changes,
 inducing a continuum of short-run equi-
 libria. The mass of active firms adjusts
 toward the final equilibrium at which
 firms earn zero profits and produce at
 efficient scale.
 To examine these ideas in more detail
 we return to our original general equilib-
 rium example. Recall consumer A's own-
 ership share of firms is 0. For 0 > 3/7
 there is a unique equilibrium for [E(oa)],
 the unique ADM equilibrium of E(O),
 and DSD is satisfied. For any initial mass
 of active firms that leaves consumers in
 their consumption sets when each active
 firm produces at the efficient point (-1,
 1), the dynamics defined by dpldt = ir(VL)
 converge to the unique equilibrium
 * = 7/6. On the other hand, if O.K 3/7,
 then the unique ADM equilibrium re-
 mains ,u* = 7/6, but this allocation is not
 even locally stable. It is not locally stable
 for either the first-stage tatonnement or
 for the third-stage entry dynamic using
 the "inverse demand" given in Section
 V. See Lars Svensson (1984).
 The example at hand lends itself to a
 planning interpretation. Suppose that
 the central authority provides licenses for
 opening or closing facilities, but aside
 from this allows prices to be flexible. In
 the example we start with a certain mass
 of licensed facilities. If 0 > 3/7, then the
 procedure that has facilities open when
 profits are positive and closed when there
 are losses converges to the unique Pareto
 optimal allocation.
 Let us summarize the dynamics. Prior
 to this section we were concerned with
 static analysis. We treated time in the
 spirt of Debreu's Theory of Value, by
 dating all commodities and opening all
 markets only once for the purpose of de-
 ciding on "who was to deliver what to
 whom and on what date." In this section
 the analysis is dynamic and temporary
 equilibrium in spirit. Markets open for
 today's exchange. The prices determined
 in those markets determine profits,
 which induce factor movements and a dif-
 ferent distribution of firms tomorrow.
 The new distribution of immoble factors
 makes tomorrow's prices different from
 today's and so profits differ, etc. In our
 temporary equilibrium analysis we as-
 sume that firms are myopic; they do not
 consider how prices will change over
 time. Even with such nearsightedness,
 for our example, when prices provide the
 correct entry signals and so equilibrium
 exists, equilibrium is globally stable. This
 of course provides a strong link between
 the existence and stability theorem, and
 we consider this to be very much in the
 spirit of both Walrasian and Marshallian
 analysis.
 VII. Conclusion
 As we have shown, with the right
 model it is not so difficult to travel be-
 tween the world of the general equilib-
 rium theorist and the Marshallian, partial
 equilibrium analyst. Furthermore, there
 are substantial gains from trade! A rigor-
 ous general equilibrium framework in-
 corporates the Marshallian model, with
 marginal firms and U-shaped average
 costs. Perfect competition pertains to
 markets where firms are relatively small.
 In this case their ability to influence price
 disappears and price-taking behavior re-
 sults from our theory. This is because
 in perfectly competitive environments
 the production sector mimics the behav-
 ior of a manager who is unable to influ-
 ence price. Notice the enhancement of
 the classical welfare theorems: Competi-
 tion leads to the number of active firms
 consistent with Pareto efficiency; it does
 not require the assumption of convex
 technology for the second welfare theo-
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 rem (this is in part because Cournot equi-
 librium does not require convexity); it
 highlights the effects of the distribution
 of wealth on the entry signals conveyed
 by prices and so on. Finally, the assump-
 tion that profits induce entry (and losses
 induce exit) plays a major role in the anal-
 ysis and suggests a classical but much
 neglected dynamics that fits well with the
 Marshallian vision.
 Our analysis suggests that we need not
 be content with a general equilibrium
 theory that excludes marginal firms and
 free entry and hypothesizes price-taking
 behavior for firms without regard to their
 strategic opportunities. At the same time
 we need not settle for a theoryNof value
 that does not account for intermarket ef-
 fects and relies on indirect measures,
 such as consumer and producer surplus,
 for its welfare economics. We should be
 all the more suspicious of a theory that
 loosely specifies behavior and equilib-
 rium. The theory exposited here does
 have its special features, but it is precise,
 and it allows us to encompass both the
 Marshallian framework and the classical
 welfare theorems. With this theory less
 compromise between descriptive rele-
 vance and mathematical precision is
 required, and as a result there should
 be better communication between the
 "highbrow" and the "bread and butter"
 theorists.
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